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STATE INTEREST AND MARRIAGE-THE
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Brian H. Bix*
Connie Post has seen an awful lot of dresses, wedding cakes and
bouquet tosses. No big surprise: Post, wed 10 times, is apparently
Ohio's most-married woman. "I do believe in marriage and I think the
way I've lived my life proves it, " she said. I
By the conference description, we are to consider "the relationship
of marriage and self-government. 2 It is hard to analyze the relationship
of these two, because they are "moving targets." Everyone thinks they
know what is meant by "marriage," but as the debate ensues about the
extension (e.g., to same-sex couples) and modification (e.g., for
covenant marriage rules) of marriage, and our social norms about the
roles of parents (married or not) and spouses change, one might wonder
how much is certain and agreed upon and how much is fluid and up for
review and revision.3
The difficulties are at least as great, and probably greater, in
speaking of "self-government." The conference organizer's intention
appears to be to refer to the democratic self-government of a nation.
However, one could also speak of the ability of individual states or of
communities to govern themselves, and, with only a slight extension, the
self-government of a household, a (married) couple, or even an
d
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota.
Presented at "A Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families," Hofstra University School of
Law, March 2003. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Karen Helfand Bix, Robert J.
Levy, Miranda Oshige McGowan, and the participants at the Hofstra conference.
1. Brad Hunter, Weird But True, N.Y. POST, Feb. 17,2003, at 0 17.
2. BROCHURE FOR "A CONFERENCE ON MARRIAGE, DEMOCRACY, AND FAMILIES," HOFSTRA
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (March 2003) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
3. I discuss some of these issues in Brian Bix, Reflections on the Nature of Marriage, in
REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 111-19 (Alan J. Hawkins,
et al., eds. 2002) [hereinafter Bix, Reflections].
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individual.4 On the individual level (and similarly for couples), the state
can help or hamper a citizen's efforts to direct his or her life-making
opportunities or legal powers available or placing costs, barriers, or
prohibitions on certain choices. This point has obvious relevance to the
question of state policy regarding marriage (for example, state laws
regarding who can marry, such as laws prohibiting bigamy and
polygamy, incest restrictions, and laws restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples), 5 but, as will be discussed, states can affect the "self-
government" of couples in more subtle ways as well. And the self-
government of communities and states is at least partly in tension with
the self-government of the nation-this is the issue of federalism.
Part I of this Article will discuss the general questions about the
proper way to understand and characterize the government's interests in
the marital status of its citizens. Part II will raise some of the
complications created by the federal system in the United States. Part III
will consider some additional issues regarding inclusion, exclusion, and
social norms.
I. THE STATE INTEREST IN MARRIAGE--GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
First, it should be noted that it is not necessary or inevitable that the
state be involved in marriage at all. Here, one can look both to history
and to recent theory. As to history, Lawrence Stone tells us that in
England, until well into the sixteenth century, neither Church nor state
regulated marriage in a systematic way.6 The lack of systematic or
4. A central element of Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy (and that of many thinkers since
Kant) is the ability of individuals to govern themselves, a notion summarized by the concept of
"autonomy." See, e.g., Henry E. Allison, Immanuel Kant, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPH-I 435, 437 (Ted Honderich, ed. 1995); J. B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF
AUTONOMY 6 (1998).
5. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 2-76 (4th ed. 1999)
("Restrictions on Who May Marry").
6. See LAWRENCE STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS AND BROKEN LIVES 15-35 (1995). Consider
also the following, from Alan Macfarlane, who divides "the English wedding as it developed over
the centuries" into two separate acts where the first, the "betrothal," was the legally significant act
(the second, "voluntary" act was the public celebration or announcement). ALAN MACFARLANE,
MARRIAGE AND LOVE IN ENGLAND: MODES OF REPRODUCTION 1300-1840 309 (1986). Macfarlane
adds:
An important feature of the [betrothal, the legally binding aspect of marriage,] was that it
originally involved no religious or ritual element. It was a purely personal, private, civil
contract, only to be entered into by the couple. There was no necessity for a clergyman
to be present, or for any religious ceremony. A marriage was valid without banns or
license, at any hour, in any building. This continued to be the case from Anglo-Saxon
times to Hardwick's Marriage Act of 1753.
Id. at 310.
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pervasive control by those institutions was exemplified by the practices
of informal and clandestine marriage-such marriages may not have
been common, but their presence and acceptance were nonetheless
significant.7 Clandestine marriage had a theological grounding:
In the thirteenth century Pope Innocent III had decreed that the free
consent of both spouses, not the formal solemnities by a priest or in a
church, was the sole essence of marriage. Consequently a valid and
binding marriage was created by a mere verbal contract, performed by
an exchange of vows to this effect between a man and a woman over
the age of consent (14 and 12), witnessed by two persons, and
expressed in the present tense.
8
The English civil law did not take regulatory control of marriage in any
effective way until the Marriage Act of 1753, which forbad clandestine
marriages.9 There is some indication that Church and state entered the
regulation of marriage not entirely from high motives, but in large part
to respond to the special interests of particular groups-the interest of
the propertied classes in reducing the uncertainty regarding property that
can arise from lack of clarity regarding a couple's marital status, and the
desire of rich and noble families to prevent their children's secret
marriages with "unworthy" partners.10
While history offers examples of the state not being fully or
systematically involved in the regulation of marriage, some
contemporary theorists have offered reasons why the state should stop
regulating marriage. Most prominently, Martha Fineman has argued that
the state should be neutral among intimate relationships, and be
7. See JULIA BRIGGS, THIS STAGE-PLAY WORLD 54 (2d ed., 1997) ("[I]n England the great
majority of weddings were performed in church, preceded by the reading of banns, or, at short
notice, the obtaining of a special license," but there were two other forms of marriage, including
forms that allowed for clandestine marriages); J. A. SHARPE, EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: A SOCIAL
HISTORY 1550-1760 62 (2d ed. 1997) ("The church was anxious that [the marriage] contract should
be made in a formal and public service ... Even so, an indeterminable number of unions, especially
among the lower orders, took place without any formal church ceremony. .. . [C]landestine
marriages.., were a continual problem."); DAVID CRESSY, BIRTH, MARRIAGE AND DEATH:
RITUAL, RELIGION, AND THE LIFE-CYCLE 1N TUDOR AND STUART ENGLAND 316-35 (1997)
("Clandestine and Irregular Marriages").
8. STONE, supra note 6, at 20; cf BRIGGS, supra note 7, at 54 ("Secret marriages were easier
to effect at a time when marriage required witnesses, but was legally binding without the formal
civil and religious sanctions it acquired after 1753."); KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY 1580-
1680 67 (1982) (discussing how the church of England, unlike the churches of continental Europe,
"continued to recognize as legally binding two other forms of valid, though irregular marriage"
beyond formal union in a church).
9. See STONE, supra note 6, at 24-33.
10. Seeid.atIO-35.
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concerned only with supporting the parent-child relationship."1 Under
this proposal, couples (or polygamous groups) would be free to go
through private or religious marriage ceremonies, but these would not
affect the participants' legal rights and obligations. 12 Intimate relations
among adults would be regulated much as other relations between
adults, by rules of contract and property (and, at the outer limit, criminal
law). 13 Professor Fineman's argument is grounded on criticism of the
way that the traditional family (arguably) helps to foster sexual
inequality, and the way that current state policies expressly and
implicitly favor some forms of intimate relationship (for example,
opposite-sex couples within traditional marriages) over other forms,
without justification. 14
However, the current situation is that the government (in the United
States and in most other countries) is involved in the regulation of
marriage, and there is no indication that the government is likely to
withdraw from this area any time soon. There are rules for entry into
marriage, legal rights and obligations the spouses have against one
another based on their marital status, certain legal benefits and
obligations the couple has against the government and other third parties
based on marital status, and rules for exit from marriage (divorce, and its
aftermath). 15 In discussions of what rules to have, or which rules to
change, officials and politicians often refer to government or societal
interests regarding marriage.' 6 The coming subsections attempt to offer a
brief (and far from comprehensive) overview of the types of interests
that are at stake.
A. Government Serving Citizens' Interests
Given that the government is, and seems likely to stay, in the
business of regulating marriage (and using marital status as a significant
category in the assignment of rights, benefits, and obligations), one can
11. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226-33 (1995).
12. See id. at 229.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 143-44, 228-30.
15. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989) (summarizing the
changes in rules regarding entry into and exit out of marriage, the couple's legal benefits and
obligations against the government and third parties, and the spouses' legal benefits and obligations
against each other as a couple).
16. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden: Same-Sex Marriage; Bush Backs Bid to
Block Gays from Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at Al.
[Vol. 32:93
STATE INTEREST AND MARRIAGE
ask about what purposes the state can and should pursue. The
government can serve the interests of its citizens either directly or
indirectly. 17 This subsection deals with serving citizens' interests
directly. As regards marriage, the state could argue that if its citizens
want to marry, the state should do what it can to provide that institution,
educate the public about it, and make access to it easy. On the whole,
this reflects the current state of things in the United States, where, with
some prominent exceptions (for example, barriers for same-sex couples
and polygamous marriages), the substantive and procedural barriers to
marriage are relatively few and trivial. 18 Similarly, if citizens want to
divorce, the state could be seen as an agent making this "service"
available to its citizens. (Of course, a pure service model becomes
difficult when the spouses disagree about whether they want the
marriage to continue, and one must also, of course, consider the effects
on children, and the effects on society generally, of giving citizens what
they want in this area, whether the spouses agree or not.)
B. Indirect Interests-Marriage Options and Marriage Contracts
There is also a more indirect way in which the state can serve its
individual citizens-by empowering them through allowing them to
make binding commitments. This point is relevant both to
marriage/divorce/covenant marriage, and to the related ability of couples
to enter premarital or marital contracts that modify the state's default
rules of marriage and divorce.
Until the last few decades, couples in most states were not able to
enter enforceable premarital or marital agreements that affected the
financial rights and obligations arising from their marriage or from its
dissolution. 19 Under current law, every state now recognizes the
enforceability of premarital agreements (the enforceability of marital
agreements, which are agreements entered into during the marriage, may
17. So much could be common ground between a more conventional view of the state as a
servant to its citizens, and a more cynical public choice view of the state as the locus of rent-seeking
by various self-interested groups. (Public choice theory is the application of basic economic theory
to political decisionmaking, portraying officials and lobbyists as cooperating and trading for mutual
gain, not (primarily) in the service of the public good. For a discussion, see generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).)
18. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 15, at 35-84 (summarizing the legal regulation of
marriage formation in the United States and Western Europe).
19. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 150 (1998)
[hereinafter Bix, Bargaining]; Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An
Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1, 11 (1992) [hereinafter Younger, Update].
2003]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
be less certain), though many states impose significant requirements of
substantive and procedural fairness. 20 However, there are significant
limits on the scope of such agreements. Of greatest importance, they
cannot bind the parties or the courts on issues regarding children (child
custody, visitation, and child support),2' and the parties cannot enter
premarital agreements that constrain their ability to seek a divorce.
As to the second limit, while the idea of private contracting out of
parts of a state's divorce regime is structurally similar to covenant
marriage statutory rules (which give couples an option, at the time of
marriage or after marriage, of basically opting out of the no-fault
alternative for divorce),23 and while allowing such agreements to be
enforceable has some support among commentators, to date no state has
allowed this sort of provision in a premarital agreement to be
enforceable (though there is little case law on the matter).24
The argument in favor of allowing the partners to a marriage to
affect the terms of their marriage is roughly similar to the argument for
allowing parties to a commercial transaction to choose the terms of their
agreement, and even which state's contract law will apply to the
transaction.25 In each case, parties are allowed to modify the terms of
20. For an overview of the enforceability of premarital agreements, see Bargaining, supra
note 19, at 148-58; Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1059 (1988); see Younger, Update, supra note 19, at 5, 7. For an overview on marital
agreements, see, for example, LAURA W. MORGAN & BRETT R. TURNER, ATTACKING AND
DEFENDING MARITAL AGREEMENTS 455 (2001) ("Most states have held that the standard of validity
and enforceability of postnuptial agreements is the same as that governing antenuptial agreements.")
(footnote omitted).
21. See, e.g., MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 20, at 390; UNIFORM PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (premarital agreements may not cover
child support).
22. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08 cmt. a (2002).
23. For the covenant marriage rules in the three states that have passed such laws, see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to
9-11-811 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-9:275.1 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). The
initial data indicates that the take-up rate for covenant marriage, at least in Louisiana, has been
relatively low-five percent or lower. Laura Sanchez et al., The Implementation of Covenant
Marriage in Louisiana, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 192, 198 (2001) ("[O]nly 1.5% of all newly
contracted marriages [in Louisiana] in 1998 were covenants."); Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant
Marriage Turns Five Years Old, MICH. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming, 2003) (manuscript at 10, on
file with author) ("Currently, less than 2% of all newly contracted marriages in Louisiana are
covenants.") (footnote omitted).
24. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the ALl proposals, see Brian H. Bix,
Premarital Agreements in the ALl Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
231,239-43 (2001).
25. See generally Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L.Q. 255
(2002) (discussing the value of choice of law rules for commercial and family agreements)
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their arrangement in ways that best serve their joint interests.26 There
are, of course, limits to this argument: both ways in which even freedom
of contract is limited for commercial agreements, as well as reasons for
treating marital commitments differently from commercial
27
connections.
On one hand, giving greater control over the terms of marriage to
the parties may lead to marriages more suited to the individual needs and
preferences of parties and (thus also) to more marriages. On the other
hand, the terms of those "additional" marriages may be one-sided, such
that they may fail to serve the interests either of the weaker party to the
marriage or, depending on the further effects of having such marriages,
the interests of society.28 Additionally, while allowing parties to tailor
their marriage terms to their relationship (or at least to choose from a
"menu" of marriage options) 29 might allow parties to optimize terms and
to create more precise "signals" to one another regarding their
preferences for married life, there might be problems in the confused
"signals" to the general public, who will not know which social norms to
reinforce because they would likely not know or be able to quickly
30ascertain the terms of each couple's marriage.
C. Indirect Interests-Marital Sacrifices and
Property Division Upon Divorce
The state can also indirectly serve the interests of individuals by
making sure that their sacrifices within marriage will have a substantial
return. The change in property division rules (justifying equitable
transfer of property based on work in the home and other sacrifices) 31
and in alimony (with alimony being increasingly grounded on
[hereinafter Bix, Proposal]; see also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of
Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 472-73 (1998) (arguing that
agreements regarding marriage create net gains in trades away from the default position).
26. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 25, at 466.
27. Some of these limiting arguments and policies are considered in Bix, Proposal, supra note
25, at 263-64, 266-71.
28. This last point is based in part on discussions with Katharine Silbaugh.
29. On the idea of a "menu" of options, see Bix, Bargaining, supra note 19, at 177-79, n. 124.
30. Compare Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201-44 (F. H. Buckley, ed. 1999), with Eric A. Posner,
Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT at 256-74
(debating the advantages and disadvantages of contract marriage).
31. See generally Grace Granz Blumberg, The Financial Incidents of Family Dissolution, in
CROSS CURRENTS 390-98 (Sanford N. Katz et al., eds. 2000).
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"contribution" to the household, rather than by "status" or "need") 32 are
moves in this direction. A similar effect is obtained by a "partnership"
theory of marriage, whether effected by a community marital property
regime, 33 by a presumption of equal division upon divorce, or a
combination of the two.
34
D. Encouraging Marriage
If we take it as a given, for the moment, that having a greater
percentage of adults married is, on the whole, better for society
generally, or better for the children being raised,35 one question is the
appropriate ways in which the state can encourage marriage.36
Traditionally, the encouragement of marriage occurred through
laws and social norms which both offered substantial benefits to couples
37living together within marriage, and placed substantial penalties on
couples living together outside of marriage. Among the legal penalties
32. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 22, § 5.02 cmt. a (prescribing a focus for
"alimony/spousal maintenance" on compensating for losses and sacrifices during the marriage,
rather than on need).
33. One should be precise: community property regards the ownership and control of property
during the marriage. Most community property states (like all common law property states) have
equitable division rules upon divorce, so that the equal title to marital property during the marriage
does not guarantee an equal split upon divorce (California is an exception, requiring an equal
division upon divorce. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2003)). However, when one's starting point
is fifty-fifty, it is, psychologically speaking, much more likely that the final figure will be at or near
fifty-fifty.
34. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-712(l)(a) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2002) (establishing
community property with a presumption of equal division of marital property upon divorce).
35. According to a White House press release:
There is an abundant body of research proving that children raised in households headed
by continuously married parents fare, on average, better than children growing up in any
other family structure. Children growing up without a married mother and father are
more likely to experience school failure, to suffer from emotional disturbance or
depression, and to abuse drugs.
Press Release, The White House, Working Toward Independence 19 (Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book.pdf)
[hereinafter Working Toward Independence].
36. One important element of encouraging marriage that will not be discussed in detail here is
the effort to remove those rules and benefits criteria not directly related to family policy but which
have the unintended effect of discouraging marriage. This was often claimed to be the case with
welfare rules. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Strict Limits on Welfare Benefits Discourage Marriage,
Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at Al.
37. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (summarizing some of the state
law benefits available to married couples in Hawaii, in the context of a challenge to the exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL
UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 137-38 (2002) (discussing the 1049 federal rights and
benefits available to married persons).
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were a variety of legal discriminations against what we now call "non-
marital children," 38 and very little recourse for the economically weaker
party (in an opposite-sex couple, usually the woman) to recover property
not in her name-or anything even approximating alimony-once a non-
marital relationship had ended.39
In recent years, public officials and other policy advocates have
again urged the strong public and governmental encouragement of
marriage. In a February 2002 press release describing President Bush's
proposals for welfare reform, the President emphasized that one of the
goals would be "to encourage the formation and maintenance of two
parent married families and responsible fatherhood.' 4° It is interesting to
note that arguments for encouraging marriage tend to come in three
distinct types: (1) the effects of marital status on children (probably the
most common in current debates);41 (2) the instrumental effects of
marital status on the surface well-being of the adults involved;42 and
38. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 1301-06 (9th ed. 2001) (summarizing the changing constitutional treatment of
illegitimacy and related classifications); see also JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
FRATERNITY 156 (University of Chicago Press 1991) (1873):
Perhaps the most pointed of all illustrations of the moral character of civil law is to be
found in the laws relating to marriage and inheritance.... Take the case of illegitimate
children. A bastard isfilius nullius-he inherits nothing, he has no claim on his putative
father. What is all this except the expression of the strongest possible determination on
the part of the Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage in every possible
manner as the foundation of civilized society? It has been plausibly maintained that these
laws bear hardly upon bastards, punishing them for the sins of their parents. It is not
necessary to my purpose to go into this, though it appears to me that the law is right.
Id.
39. See Blumberg, supra note 31, at 401 ("the dissolution of... non-marital relationships...
since the 1970s... ha[s] been regulated by contract law in most jurisdictions [but this has] not
prove[n] satisfactory in theory or practice.") (footnotes omitted).
40. See Working Towards Independence, supra note 35. As the White House press release
indicated, the 1996 Welfare Reform law had a similar objective, but stated it in terms of'"two-parent
families," while President Bush wanted to clarify that it is part of the objective to increase the
number of married parents. See id
41. See generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE
(2000) (arguing that divorce has significant and long-lasting negative effects on children).
42. See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000) (the book's
argument is summarized in its title). But see Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and
the Set Point Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003) (concluding that for most people, change in marital status will not result
in a long-term change in level of happiness). One finds a somewhat more subtle variation of the
instrumental value theme in some of the literature on the economics of marriage-for example, in
the argument that a more traditional marriage allows the partners to maximize their utility through a
division of labor. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30-79 (enlarged ed.
199 1) (discussing the division of labor within households).
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(3) arguments within faith-based communities based on the teachings of
the faith in question.43 One piece of the argument that is usually
missing,4 one that fits between the instrumental arguments (for
example, that marriage has good bottom-line effects on adult partners,
and divorce has bad effects on children) and the faith-based arguments,
is a moral one, grounded in claims about virtue and the good, without
depending on the commands of some divine being, sacred book, or
religious institution. A second, usually missing, piece is being filled in
by the organizer of this conference, Linda McClain, and some of the
conference's other participants-the possible value of marriage to
society, beyond the (purported) instrumental value in making more
healthy and mature adults and better-raised children. This view is often
characterized in terms of the value of intermediate institutions (including
marriage) to the health of civil society.45' '
What is also worth noting is how little discussion there is within the
media of the simple point that if marriage is good, either for the adult
partners, for the children being raised within the household, or for
society generally (whether because of the benefits to children and adults
already mentioned, or because of some other causal link), then there are
good reasons to extend this benefit to same-sex couples and/or
46polygamous groupings.
43. See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT (1997) (discussing how
religion influenced Western marriage law).
44. There are exceptions. See generally, Scott Fitzgibbon, Marriage and the Good of
Obligation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 41 (2002) (discussing the benefits of marital obligation in terms of
secular, primarily Aristotelean, philosophy).
45. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1019, 1070 (2001) (addressing the "perennial Western ideal that stable marriages and families are
essential to the survival, flourishing, and happiness of the greater commonwealths of church, state,
and civil society"); cf Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility,
Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1673 (2001) (discussing other aspects of
domestic relations policy, in particular, the promotion of care, in civic republican terms); see
generally Philip Pettit, Republicanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/ (Edward N. Zalta ed.) (last modified Jan. 10, 2003).
46. This point is made often enough by those advocating recognition of same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 249-53 (1999) (arguing that all the reasons that
make marriage valuable are reasons to extend the institution to same-sex couples); Bix, Reflections,
supra note 3, at 115-16 (arguing that if the purpose of marriage is to help children, then the
institution should be extended to same-sex couples). There is little discussion anywhere about
polygamy-as those advocating same-sex marriage tend to want to distance their cause from a
different unpopular domestic arrangement. See Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or
Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1501, 1594-96 (1997).
By my comments, I do not mean to imply that there have not been past and present unpleasant
associations with polygamous practices, including sexist assumptions or the exploitation of under-
age women. See generally Michael Janofsky, Young Brides Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at Al (examining accusations related to the contemporary polygamous
[Vol. 32:93
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E. Non-Marital Cohabitation
There are inevitable tensions between the desire of governments to
encourage marriage and the need for governments to be fair to, and to
respond to the interests of, those in long-term non-marital
relationships.47 In particular, there is a puzzle of how to be fair to people
living in non-marital relationships without simultaneously undermining
much of the incentive for marriage. The point is that every advantage
given to non-marital couples is a reduction in the relative advantage to
being married.48 On the other hand, not recognizing claims based on
non-marital cohabitation risks permitting significant injustices to go
uncompensated.49 Within the United States, only the state of Washington
has formalized the right to bring equitable claims based on a long-term
non-marital cohabitation; 50 other jurisdictions have allowed recovery
based on common law claims, such as those based on contract or
restitution.5 1
F. Government Interests and Legal Rights
There are certain paradoxes regarding government policy about
marriage.
First, there are certain rights and obligations, some of them mere
default rules (subject to being contracted around-by a premarital or
marital agreement that meets certain criteria), but many of them non-
practices of one community). However, such problems from past practices, or from the current
practices of particular groups, falls far short of proof that polygamy is so inherently immoral that it
should either be the subject of criminal penalties or at least should never receive state recognition.
Conversely, tying the argument for same-sex marriage to polygamy was one of the main arguments
used by opponents of same-sex marriage. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 37, at 131.
47. See Scott & Scott, supra note 30; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment:
The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1465 (2001)
(arguing for treating cohabitation and marriage similarly in certain circumstances).
48. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (I11. 1979) (offering this justification
for refusing to enforce an alleged contract between non-marital cohabitants).
49. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 311-12 (Wis. 1987) (recognizing that "refusal
to enforce contract and property rights" between non-marital couples may result in one partner
retaining all accumulated assets).
50. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (Wash. 2001) (summarizing the
doctrine in a case where the claim was brought by one partner of a same-sex couple).
51. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (the first important
"palimony" case, recognizing claims arising from a long-term non-marital relationship); Watts, 405
N.W.2d at 313, 314 (allowing unmarried cohabitant to assert contract and unjust enrichment claims
against the other party to the cohabitation).
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waivable 2 Afthe same time, some of these same rights and obligations
are considered unenforceable (under the doctrine of "family privacy") if
brought by parties still in an intact marriage.53 Of course, one can
understand some of the policy reasons behind non-enforcement. Courts
might suspect that allowing spouses to bring court actions for
insufficient support or insufficient care would lead to a flood of
litigation that would overburden already overburdened family courts.
Additionally, there is some question about whether the floodgates could
ever be reduced by the usual means-such as by making the cases more
predictable through the creation of relatively bright-line rules. Among
other likely complications, the cases may turn on matters that are
difficult to prove (or, where proof of violation is clear, there might still
be doubt regarding when violations might be "justified" or "excused").
Additionally, family matters are notorious for being an area where angry
parties will bring and maintain lawsuits even when the law is clearly
against them.
5 4
At the same time, the refusal to enforce spousal duties combined
with a refusal to allow some of them to be "contracted around" (that is,
refusal to allow them to be modified or waived in enforceable contracts),
leaves the parties relatively powerless, with exit from the marriage the
only legal recourse.55
Someone might respond that this is only to see part of the picture.
When legal enforcement of standards is not available, this could be seen
as a judgment that enforcement is better left to social forces.56 However,
this assumes that the forces of conventional morality are (still)
responsive to the norms covering spousal obligations to one another
even though there is growing evidence that social pressures (and legal
pressures as well) are today far more focused on and responsive to
52. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18-19, 20 (Cal. App. 1993) (holding that an
agreement by a husband to pay his wife for nursing services was unenforceable, as against public
policy, in part because spouses have an existing statutory duty to care for one another).
53. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (dismissing a claim
based on the husband's statutory obligation of support on the basis that the parties were not living
separate and apart, and because the level of non-support had not reached harmful levels).
54. See, e.g., Conference, High-Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children-
Conference Report and Action Plan, 34 FAM. L.Q. 589, 590 (2001) (discussing the serious problem
of high-conflict custody cases, in which the parties, among other things, show "a high level of anger
and a willingness to engage in repetitive litigation").
55. And, of course, the situation was much more problematic some decades ago, when exit
from marriage was difficult, and almost none of the aspects of marriage could be contracted about
between the parties. See Bix, Bargaining, supra note 19, at 150.
56. See generally Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133 (1996).
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responsibilities of parents to children than they are to the responsibilities
of spouses to one another.57
II. FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
An ongoing problem with government policies regarding marriage
and the family is the tension created by a combination of "our
federalism" and the constitutional idea of national citizenship, as
instantiated by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 58 (and the court cases construing those provisions).
On one hand, family law policy is generally left to the states.59
However, it is important to note that, while lawmaking in this area has
devolved to the states, it has not (with few exceptions) devolved further,
to municipalities or other sub-state communities and institutions.6 °
The tension comes when the rights of states to create different
family and marriage policies for their residents conflicts with the interest
in national citizenship-the value that people should have certain basic
rights as United States citizens, wherever they might live, and that they
should not lose significant rights by moving from one state to another
(the right to interstate travel).6'
On one hand, the combination of national citizenship (as enforced
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing
marriages validly celebrated in another state,62 meant that when it looked
like Hawaii might recognize same-sex marriages, there was a fear (by
some, a hope by others) that all other states would have to recognize
57. See generally JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS (2000). While there may
still be a general consensus on certain marital norms (e.g., that adultery is wrong), other norms (for
example, the proper division of responsibility within a household or equality between the spouses)
have become far more contested, and therefore less susceptible to social support and enforcement.
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
59. Though the federal government has become increasingly involved, primarily through
tying compliance to suggested policies as the condition for significant federal subsidies, family law
remains largely state-based. See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital
Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (summarizing recent congressional
intrusions on state family law policy); see also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 1787, 1789 (1995).
60. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1198-99 (1992)
(discussing how states have substantial control over municipalities' regulation of domestic law).
61. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31
(1969); cf Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975) (holding that Iowa's one-year residency
requirement for divorce does not violate the right to interstate travel).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
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same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.63 This was the motivation behind
the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").64 The purpose of that Act was
to give congressional authorization for states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions, if they so chose. 65
It has been less clear what the cross-state consequences from a
recognized legal relationship that fell short of marriage would be. With
Vermont's experience with "civil unions," the problem has not been that
other states have been forced to recognize that status; to the contrary, the
problem has been that other states have felt no duty to give it any
recognition at all (or have in fact felt bound not to recognize it).
Vermont's "civil union" statute allows same-sex partners to obtain
within Vermont the same rights and obligations as opposite-sex partners
can obtain (in any of the states) through marriage.66 However, those who
have obtained such a civil union have had great difficulty having that
legal relationship recognized or respected in other jurisdictions as a
"marriage" for the purpose of interpreting a consent decree visitation
clause. 67
Similarly, while Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas have created
"covenant marriage" options68 that allow couples in those states to
choose a more binding form of marriage for themselves, it has remained
unclear whether other states are legally bound to respect that choice, if
and when someone in a covenant marriage goes to the courts in one of
those other states and asks for a no-fault divorce (contrary to the terms
of the covenant marriage).69
63. See Carl Iseli, Editorial, The Meaning of Marriage in a State, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
2003, at A21.
64. The relevant portion of DOMA appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2003). The Act also
contains a definition of marriage for the purposes of federal legislation, confining marriage to
opposite-sex couples. I U.S.C. § 7 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996).
66. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
67. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002) (refusing to dissolve a
Vermont civil union because of strong public policy against same-sex marriages); Burns v. Bums,
560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App. 2002) (refusing to view a civil union as a "marriage" for the purpose of
interpreting a consent decree visitation clause); see generally Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were
Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2003, § 9, at 2 (reporting that a Texas court refused to
grant a divorce to a Vermont civil union since the Vermont civil union statute requires those seeking
the dissolution of a civil union within Vermont to have been resident in that state for one year). But
see Elissa Gootman, Judge Allows Suit in Death of Gay Mate, N.Y. Times, April 16, 2003, at D8
(describing a Long Island, New York, case in which civil union partner was allowed to file a
wrongful death lawsuit as a spouse).
68. See supra, note 23.
69. As far as I know there is no case law yet on this issue, but even Katherine Shaw Spaht,
one of the original proponents of covenant marriage, believes that other states would be free to grant
a no-fault divorce in those circumstances. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides,
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There is a general tension, of course, between a community's
ability to enforce, or at least encourage, shared values on the one hand,
and the national rights of citizenship and the right of interstate travel on
the other. This tension exists regardless of where (below the federal
level) one places the policy-making power regarding marriage.
However, additional moral and policy complications arise by leaving the
decision at the state level rather than at a more local level. Any decision
to shape family life in one direction or another (for example, by
encouraging traditional marriages or extending marriages to same-sex
couples) makes an area more attractive to one group of people and less
attractive to another. There is inevitably a balance between the benefits
of allowing a community to define its own character and the costs that
such self-definition might impose on individuals who do not fit into that
self-definition. On the side of group or community self-government, we
can speak of the ideals behind the right of association, and even the right
of intimate association. At the same time, allowing state regulation of
such association (making decisions about inclusion and exclusion, or
about which lifestyles to support at the state level) potentially poses a
significant threat to equal opportunity or the equal access to public
establishments.7 ° If the same sort of decision regarding regulation or
support were to be made at a much more local level-if, say, an
apartment complex or a small village declared itself strongly supportive
of same-sex marriage or polygamy or traditional gender roles within
marriage-the cost to third parties excluded or offended by these
policies, and thus strongly encouraged to move elsewhere, would not be
trivial, but they would be relatively modest. Compare this to a situation
where the policy is statewide, and those tied to a particular region by
work or family might not have a reasonable option of exit to a friendlier
jurisdiction.
III. POLICY, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIAL NORMS
It is only being slightly cynical (or slightly realistic) to point out
that when we talk about "the state's interest" in marriage or in certain
Covenant Marriage and the Law of Conflicts of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1085, 1108-17
(1999). However, the authors of that article also think that if and when such a no-fault divorce is
granted in a different state, the other spouse would have a right to damages for breach of the
covenant. See id. at 1117-20.
70. Cf Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-25 (1984) (discussing when the
constitutional freedom of association must yield to countervailing state interests). The text is
primarily making a moral or policy point, and is not a claim about the current understanding of the
constitutional freedom of association or how that understanding might or should be changed.
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family law policies, we are referring to the judgment regarding the
state's interest made by a majority of legislators along with the governor
(or, at the federal level, Congress and the President). This in turn may
reflect the judgment of a majority of voters-or at least a large portion
of those pressure groups with the greatest influence. Not to turn this into
either a civics lesson on the one hand, or an outline of public choice
theory7' on the other, the point is simply that family law policy can and
will change as the judgment or preferences of those with direct or
indirect power to create family law and policy change.
There are some blatant examples from the early parental rights (and
educational rights) decisions of Meyer v. Nebraska72 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.7 3 In those cases, legislative majorities tried to
constrain the educational rights of minority populations within the state
(in Meyer, the right of the children of German-speaking parents to learn
German at school,74 and, in Pierce, the right of Catholic families to send
their children to private schools). 75 The efforts of the majority to define
the common good and to try to mold the thinking within their
communities succeeded at the state level, but was overridden by
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which held that the
objectives sought were beyond the constitutional powers granted to the
states (due to the limits on state power imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution).76 There have been other occasions
where the will of the majority regarding the regulation of marriage and
families has been turned back on constitutional grounds,77 though
arguably only the anti-miscegenation laws have quite the same feel of a
majority trying to regulate how a subjugated group lives.
Even the legislation invalidated in Meyer and Pierce can be read
more charitably, and in line with other legislation regulating marriage
and family, as reflecting the views of the majority (or at least of well-
organized groups urging their views in the absence of well-organized
opposition78) regarding what is in the best interests of the community,
71. See supra note 17.
72. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
73. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
74. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-98.
75. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 518-19.
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia anti-
miscegenation law); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin law which
prohibited marriage to a class of poor Wisconsin citizens subject to court-ordered child support);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating a Washington third-party visitation law).
78. This was arguably the situation for the grandparent visitation statutes, passed in all fifty
states before some of them were invalidated by Troxel. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 n.1.
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specifically the beliefs and perceptions about the common good, where
data and conclusive arguments will usually be in short supply.
The background of social norms is thus very important. Barring
unquestionable evidence as to cause and effect, policies will necessarily
turn on normative beliefs (with varying levels of support in statistical
data, anecdote, moral theory, religious doctrine, etc.). It once made much
more sense to most Americans than it does now to force an unhappy
(and childless) married couple to stay married, as a matter of public
policy (the question changes significantly, at least for some, when there
is an argument for the couple's staying together for the sake of minor
children). It was once the case that people would commonly speak about
the state's interest in couples staying married, where this asserted
interest was not (necessarily) related to any children born to the
marriage. 79 Today we may see the individual spouses' failure to keep to
their marital commitments or to work sufficiently hard to make the
marriage work as moral or character failings, but we usually do not see
them as matters justifying state intervention.
One might respond that it is not merely a matter of people's
preferences (whether those people be citizens or officials), but rather the
truth of the matter regarding what furthers the public good. The problem
is that social scientists seem unable to give us "the truth of the matter,"
in a clear and uncontroversial way, on most issues. Even for many basic
and oft-studied questions like the effect of divorce on children, and the
effect of no-fault divorce laws on the divorce rate, no firm and final
answer seems to have been agreed upon.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the fact that our government regulates marriage, and will
likely continue to do so into the indefinite future, we should try to think
clearly about the different sorts of interests that are at stake in the
regulation of marriage (and divorce), the way such interests are
complicated by the conflicting ideals of federalism and national
79. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488-89 (N.Y. 1946) ("'The strict rules relating to
opening defaults [are] not applied to actions for divorce, because of the well known vigilance of the
courts to prevent collusion, and because of the general interest of the people of the state in the
preservation of the matrimonial status of its citizens."') (quoting 9 CARMODY, N.Y. PRAC., § 160, at
242); Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 639, 644 (Pa. 1956) ("The fact that married people do not get
along well together does not justify a divorce.... Testimony which proves merely an unhappy
union, the parties being high strung temperamentally and unsuited to each other.., is insufficient to
sustain a decree.") (citations omitted).
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citizenship, and the role of social norms in motivating, supplementing,
or undermining legal regulation.
The promotion of marriage, and the promotion of particular kinds
of marriages, as ways to strengthen civil society, is an important interest
to consider, but such efforts must be evaluated in the context of more
mundane objectives-using domestic relations laws to serve individual
interests, directly and indirectly, and trying to find a workable middle
ground between community (and state) self-government and the needs of
national citizenship.
